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Abstract
We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms
in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996,
1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for hon-
esty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to
be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong)
intrinsic preferences for honesty. Secondly, the class of e¢ cient al-
location rules that are implementable is identied provided that at
least one agent has strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly,
the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.
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1 Introduction
In implementation problems in classical economic environments, as Hurwicz
(1978), Otani and Sicilian (1982), and Thomson (1984) discuss, the informa-
tion that agents exchange in the allocation process typically concerns ongoing
prices and their optimal consumption bundles at these prices, that is, infor-
mation that lies in the graph of agentstrue demand correspondences. There-
fore, a prominent and natural restriction on mechanisms for those problems
would be represented by price-quantity mechanisms, where each agents mes-
sage consists of a pair of a price vector and a demand quantity. Moreover, to
meet the requirements of an adequate theory of implementation (see, Jack-
son, 1992), Dutta et al. (1995), Sjöström (1996), and Saijo et al. (1996, 1999)
dene the class of natural mechanisms in economic environments, a typical
example of which is a price-quantity mechanism satisfying feasibility, forth-
rightness, and the best response property; henceforth, natural price-quantity
mechanism (natural p-q mechanism).
In a seminal study that initiated a burgeoning literature, Matsushima
(2008a, 2008b) and Dutta and Sen (2012) studied implementation problems
where agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty. Loosely, an agent has
intrinsic preferences for honesty called partially-honest when she strictly
prefers to tell the truth whenever lying has no e¤ect on her material payo¤.1
This paper studies Nash implementation with partially-honest agents by
natural p-q mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal.2 It is
built upon two alternative notions of intrinsic preferences for honesty, though
for both of them the point of departure is that of the agents true demand
correspondence. With one type, a partially-honest agent has strong intrinsic
preferences for honesty if her truthful report consists of true prices as well
as of her true optimal bundle at those prices coinciding with the bundle
recommended by the allocation rule for the underlying economy. With the
other type, a partially-honest agent has weak intrinsic preferences for honesty
if her truthful report consists of her true optimal bundle compatible with the
allocation rule.
In a separable environment similar to ours, Dutta and Sen (2012) and
Kartik et al. (2014) show that any social choice function (SCF ) is imple-
mentable by a mechanism without any tail-chasingconstruction where all
1There are seminal related works such as Glazer and Rubinstein (1998), Eliaz (2002),
Corchón and Herrero (2004), and Kartik and Tercieux (2012).
2In economies with free-disposal the mechanism must only be weakly balanced.
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agents have small intrinsic preferences for honesty (a more detailed discussion
is given in section 3)3 and, like their results, none of ours hinge on any sort of
tail-chasingconstruction.4 Similarly, we also observe in section 3 that, in
light of the characterization result of Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013b), any
e¢ cient SCF is implementable by a natural p-q mechanism where all agents
have weak intrinsic preferences for honesty. This general positive result cru-
cially relies on the single-valuedness of allocation rules. If one abandons
the latter requirement (in favor of multi-valued allocation rules), that result
cannot be maintained. In fact, no natural price-quantity mechanism can
implement the Walrasian rule where all agents have weak (but not strong)
intrinsic preferences for honesty.5 Also, this contextualizing example provides
rationales that support the study of the strong variation of honesty, which,
in our view, is more appropriate for the type of implementation problems at
hand as well as more intimately connected with the notion of market equi-
librium. Then, in section 4, we identify the class of e¢ cient allocation rules
that are implementable by natural p-q mechanisms provided that there are
partially-honest agents having strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Also,
the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to this class.
Section 2 of this paper presents the theoretical framework and outlines
the basic model, whereas the main results are presented in sections 3 and 4
with a brief concluding section 5.
2 The model
There are n  3 agents in N  f1; :::; ng and `  2 distinct commodities
in L  f1; :::; `g. R is the set of reals; R+ (R++) denotes the set of non-
negative (positive) reals; R` is the Cartesian product of ordered `-tuples of
reals, whereas R`+ (R`++) denotes its non-negative (positive) orthant. Vector
inequalities are dened as follows: For all x; y 2 R`, x  y if x`  y` for each
` 2 L, x > y if x  y and x 6= y, and x y if x` > y` for each ` 2 L.
3Their equilibrium solutions are not the Nash one, as discussed in section 3 below.
4Loosely speaking, the basic idea of the argument is that if agents announce a non-
equilibrium message prole, the mechanism provides agents with material incentives to
coordinate on an equilibrium message prole. This idea crucially hinges on the fact that
agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty and that free-disposal is allowed.
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this point. Also recall
that theWalrasian rule is not Nash implementable in the standard framework (see Hurwicz
et. al., 1995).
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Each i 2 N is characterized by a consumption space R`+ (where xi =
(xi1; :::; xi`) 2 R`+ is the is commodity bundle), by an endowment vector
!i 2 R`+ and by a preference relation dened over R`+.6 Let 0 denote the
zero consumption bundle. Each is preferences have a utility representation
ui : R`+ ! R which is continuous and quasi-concave on R`+, and either
strongly monotone on R`+ or strongly monotone on R`++ such that the utility
of every interior consumption bundle is strictly higher than the utility of
any consumption bundle on the boundary. U is the class of all such utility
functions, whereas Ui is the class of admissible utility functions for i. The
aggregate endowment is denoted by 
 P!i  0,7 where the distribution
of endowments (!i)i2N 2 Rn`+ is known and xed.
Let Q  xi 2 R`+ j xi  
	. For each i, each ui, and each xi 2 Q,
L (xi; ui)  fx0i 2 Q j ui (xi)  ui (x0i)g denotes the weak lower contour set
of agent i for ui at xi. An economy is specied by a list u = (ui)i2N 2
UN  i2NUi. An allocation is a list of bundles x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn`+ ,
whereas a feasible allocation is an allocation x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn`+ such thatP
xi  
. Let 0 denote the feasible allocation in which every agent gets
the zero consumption bundle. The set of all feasible allocations is denoted
by A. Since no ambiguity can occur, u has to be understood as an element
of UN and we shall omit to refer it to UN . The set of (Pareto) e¢ cient
allocations for u, denoted by P (u), is P (u)  fx 2 A jthere is no y 2 A,
with ui (yi) > ui (xi) for all ig.
A social choice function (SCF ) is a single-valued mapping f : UN ! A
such that for each u, Fi (u) 6= 0 for all i 2 N and f (u) 2 P (u). A social
choice correspondence (SCC ) is a multi-valued mapping F : UN  A such
that for each u, F (u) is a non-empty subset of P (u) and for each x 2 F (u),
xi 6= 0 for all i 2 N . Let F be the class of all such SCC s. For each u,
each allocation in F (u) is said to be an F -optimal allocation at u. The non-
zero property of any agents consumption bundle at any F -optimal allocation
represents the minimal condition of participation constraint. Among many
elements of F , we shall be concerned with the following well-known SCC :
Walrasian correspondence, W : For each u, W (u)  fx 2 A jthere is
p 2 R`+ such that for each i, p  xi = p  !i and for each yi 2 R`+,
6Hereafter unless otherwise specied lower case letters such as h, i, j, and k should be
understood as agents in N .
7When its bounds are not explicitly indicated, a summation should be understood to
cover all agents.
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ui (yi) > ui (xi) ) p  yi > p  !ig.
A mechanism is a pair   (M; g), where M M1  :::Mn, with each
Mi being a (non-empty) set and g : M ! Rn`. It consists of a message space
M , where Mi is the message space for i, and an outcome function g such
that g (m) = (gi (m))i2N 2 Rn` for each m 2 M . A generic message for i is
denoted bymi 2Mi, while a message prole is bym  (m1; :::;mn) 2M . For
m 2 M and j, let m j  (m1; :::;mj 1;mj+1; :::;mn) 2 M j  i2NnfjgMi.
Given m j 2 M j and mj 2 Mj, (mj;m j) is the message prole consisting
of mj and m j. The attainable set of i at m i, the set of bundles that i can
induce when the other agents select m i, is denoted by g (Mi;m i).
2.1 Implementation with partially-honest agents
For any (i; u) 2 N UN , let <ui be is weak order overM under the economy
u. The asymmetric part of <ui is denoted by ui , while the symmetric part
is denoted by sui . For any u 2 UN , <u is the prole of weak orders over M
under the economy u; in other words, <u (<ui )i2N .
For each mechanism , each i, and each economy u, let T i (u;F ) be a non-
empty subset of Mi, named a partially-honest domain of i at u, by means of
which, the notion of partially-honest agents is introduced as follows:
Denition 1 Agent h has intrinsic preferences for honesty if for each mech-
anism  and each economy u, and for each m h, her weak order <uh over M
satises the following two properties.
(i) Ifmh 2 T h (u;F ), m0h =2 T h (u;F ), and uh(gh (mh;m h))  uh(gh (m0h;m h)),
then ((mh;m h) ; (m0h;m h)) 2uh;
(ii) Otherwise, ((mh;m h) ; (m0h;m h)) 2<uh if and only if uh (gh (mh;m h)) 
uh (gh (m
0
h;m h)).
An agent h who has intrisic preferences for honesty is said to be a partially-
honest agent.
The subset T i (u;F ) species the domain of the messages given in the
mechanism , on which i places an intrinsic value for honest behavior. The
notion of partially-honest domains is not only to specify at least a subset of
truthful messagesgiven in the mechanism, but also to represent the extent
of preferences for honesty each agent has in society. Therefore, though each
element in a partially-honest domain is interpreted as a truthful message
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in the mechanism, some of truthful messages would not belong to that
domain if the intrinsic value for honesty is not placed on this message by the
partially-honest agents.8
Denition 2 Agent i has no intrinsic preference for honesty if for each
mechanism  and each economy u, her weak order <ui over M satises the
following property: for each m and m0,
(m;m0) 2<ui if and only if ui (gi (m))  ui (gi (m0)) .
Unless stated otherwise, the following informational assumption holds
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 There are partially-honest agents in N , which is acknowl-
edged by the mechanism designer, though she does not know their identities
or their exact number.
The mechanism designer cannot exclude any agent from being partially-
honest on the basis of information given by Assumption 1. To formalize
this fact, let H  2Nn f?g be a non-empty class of non-empty subsets of
N . Given the truly limited information injected by Assumption 1, in what
follows we shall view H as the class of conceivable sets of partially-honest
agents. Since no ambiguity can occur, H has to be understood as an element
of H and we shall omit to refer it to H.
A mechanism  induces a class of (non-cooperative) games with partially-
honest agents
 
;<u;H
 j (u;H) 2 UN H	, where <u;H denotes the prole
of agentsweak orders over M when u is the underlying economy and H is
the set of partially-honest agents. Given a game
 
;<u;H

, we say that
m is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with partially-honest agents at u
and H if and only if for all i,
 
m;
 
mi;m

 i
 2<u;Hi for all mi. Given a
game
 
;<u;H

, NE
 
;<u;H

denotes the set of (Nash) equilibrium message
proles of
 
;<u;H

, whereas NA
 
;<u;H

represents the corresponding set
of (Nash) equilibrium allocations.
Denition 3 A mechanism  partially-honestly implements F in Nash equi-
libria, or simply partially-honestly implements F if and only if
for each u and each H : F (u) = NA
 
;<u;H

.
If such a mechanism exists, F is partially-honestly implementable.
8It is consistent with the motivation of Dutta and Sen (2012), who discuss implemen-
tation problems with small preferences for honesty.
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Denition 3 is similar, but not identical to, the standard denition of
implementation.9 First, the equilibrium allocations are given by the game 
;<u;H

rather than by the game (; u). Second, the equivalence of the
set of F -optimal allocations with the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is
required not only for each economy u but also for each conceivable set H.
2.2 Natural price-quantity mechanisms with free-disposal
Following Saijo et al. (1996, 1999), we now formalize the notion of im-
plementation with partially-honest agents by natural price-quantity mecha-
nisms with free-disposal. For each pair (ui; xi) 2 Ui  Q, Vi (xi; ui)  fyi 2
Qjui (xi)  ui (yi)g denotes the weak upper contour set of agent i for ui at
xi. Given (ui; xi), a price vector p belonging to the unit simplex , that
is, p 2 , is said to be a sub-gradient of ui at xi, denoted by rui (xi), if
p  x0i  p  xi for all x0i 2 Vi (xi; ui). The set of sub-gradients of ui at xi,
denoted by rui (xi), is called the sub-di¤erential of ui at xi.
For each (x; u) 2 QnUN , dene the set of e¢ ciency prices for u at x as
 (x; u) 
\
i
rui (xi) .
Notice that x 2 P (u) if  (x; u) is non-empty. In words,  (x; u) consists of
prices p each of which is normal to a hyperplane separating the weak upper
contour sets of all agents with u at x.
For each economy u, each F -optimal allocation x associated with u, and
each e¢ ciency price p for u at x, let us dene the following sets.
F 1 (x; p)  fu0 j x 2 F (u0) and p 2  (x; u0)g , (1)
F 1! (x; p)  fu0 j x 2 F (u0) and fpg =  (x; u0)g , (2)
F (x; u)  p 2  (x; u) j F 1! (x; p) is non-empty	 , (3)
and
F (x; u) 

F (x; u) if F (x; u) is non-empty,
 (x; u) otherwise.
(4)
9The two denitions are however identical if the family H is empty.
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Any p 2 F (x; u) is referred to as an e¢ ciency price for u and F at x.10 The
reader should consult Saijo et al. (1996, 1999) for a discussion of F 1 (x; p).
The di¤erence between F (x; u) and  (x; u) centers on whether it is
possible to select e¢ ciency prices from the set  (x; u) which are relevant for
the F -optimal allocation x at u. This point is particularly important where
F is the Walrasian correspondence (on this point see Saijo et al. 1999).
Denition 4 An SCC F 2 F is partially-honestly implementable by a nat-
ural price-quantity mechanism if there exists a mechanism  = (M; g) such
that:
(i)  partially-honestly implements F .
(ii) For each i, Mi = Q.
(iii) For each u, each x 2 F (u), and each p 2 F (x; u), if mi = (p; xi) for
each i, then m 2 NE  ;<u;H for each H and g (m) = x.
(iv)  is feasible: g (m) 2 A for each m 2M .
(v)  satises the best response property: for all i, all ui, and all m i, there
exists mi such that ui (gi (mi;m i))  ui (gi (m0i;m i)) for all m0i.
Call  a natural price-quantity mechanism (natural p-q mechanism) if  sat-
ises the above requirements (ii)-(v).
The property (iii) is the forthrightness condition for a p-q mechanism,
which requires that in equilibrium each agent receives what she has an-
nounced as a bundle.11 Observe that our forthrightness condition di¤ers
from that of Saijo et al. (1999) because it applies only to e¢ ciency prices in
F (x; u) rather than to those in  (x; u). We shall make use of this di¤er-
ence in the next sections, which will be relevant for the case where F is the
Walrasian correspondence.
10Note that, for any p 2  (x; u) with x 2 F (u), there always exists u0 2 UN such that
fpg =  (x; u0) whenever UN contains the set of all linear utility functions. Indeed, if
u0i (xi) = p  xi for all i 2 N , then fpg =  (x; u0). However, note that F 1! (x; p) 6= ?
does not necessarily follow from the case fpg =  (x; u0). For instance, if F  Wc is the
constrained Walrasian correspondence (on the denition of this, see Saijo et al. 1999), it
is possible that x 2 Wc (u), p 2  (x; u), fpg =  (x; u0), but x =2 Wc (u0), whenever p is
not a (constrained) Walrasian equilibrium price vector corresponding to x 2Wc (u).
11The reader should refer to Dutta et al. (1995), Saijo et al. (1996), and Lombardi and
Yoshihara (2013a) for a more discussion on forthrightness.
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3 A contextualizing example and further con-
nections to the literature
The main works on implementation with partially-honest agents in economic
environments are Dutta and Sen (2012) and Kartik et al. (2014). They
assume that all agents have small intrinsic preferences for honesty, and by
focussing on SCF s, have the merit of devising mechanisms that do not use any
sort of integer gamesor modulo games. Dutta and Sen (2012; Denition
11) provide a separability condition under which any SCF is implementable
in strictly dominant strategies. Kartik et al. (2014) o¤er a condition called
separable punishment (Denition 2, p. 287) under which any SCF is imple-
mentable by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies. This section is to show that their results do not extend
to our problems provided that the attention is paid to SCC s.
In Dutta and Sen (2012), an agent i has intrinsic preferences for reporting
honestly the true economy u, whereas in problems of implementation by p-
q mechanisms, at least two types of intrinsic preferences for honesty could
be considered, as discussed in section 1. The rst one is that an agent i
has intrinsic preferences for truthfully reporting her own demand quantity xi
that is also consistent with F (u), which is formalized as follows.
Denition 5 Given a natural p-q mechanism , an economy u, and an SCC
F , a partially-honest agent h has weak intrinsic preferences for honesty if her
partially-honest domain is
T h (u;F )  f(p; xh) 2 Q j 9x h : (xh; x h) 2 F (u)g .
A consumption bundle xh is said to be weakly truthful for u if and only if
(xh; x h) 2 F (u) for some x h.
Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013b) propose a condition, called Monotonic-
ity with Weak Honesty (M-WH), which is necessary for implementation by
a natural p-q mechanism provided that agents have weak intrinsic preferences
for honesty. To dene this condition, some notations should be introduced.
Let p 2  and x = (xi)i2N 2 Qn be given. If x 2 F (u) and p 2 F (x; u) for
some u, let
F 1 (x; p)  u0jx 2 F (u0) and p 2 F (x; u0)	 , (5)
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and for each i, let
Fi (x; p) 
\
u02 F 1(x;p)
L (xi; u
0
i) . (6)
Then:
Condition M-WH Let H be given. For each u and u, each x 2 F (u), and
each p 2 F (x; u), if Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for each i and x =2 F (u),
then for some i 2 H, xi 6= xi for each x 2 F (u).
M-WH is an intuitive condition: If the economy u moves to a new
economy u in such a way that for each i the weak lower contour set for
ui at xi contains the set 
F
i (x; p) and if x is an F -optimal allocation at u
but is not at u, then there must exist a partially-honest agent i for whom
the bundle xi is not weakly truthful for u.
The necessity of M-WH for the implementation is also easy to conrm:
Suppose that a natural p-q mechanism  implements the e¢ cient allocation
rule F , and let us consider any set H of partially-honest agents with weak
intrinsic preferences for honesty and any two economies u and u meeting the
premises of condtionM-WH. By the requirement (iii) of Denition 4 we are
sure that the message prole m where each agent i announces mi = (p; xi)
is an equilibrium one of the game
 
;<u;H

and that the outcome of the
mechanism is the allocation x = g (m). One way now to see the necessity
of M-WH is to assume, contrary to the statement, that for each partially-
honest agent i 2 H there exists an F -optimal allocation x at u such that
xi = xi. Thus, for each agent in H, (p; xi) is weakly truthful for u
 as
well. Since no agent can nd a protable deviation from m, one can see that
x is an equilibrium outcome of the game
 
;<u;H

, which contradicts the
supposition that x is not an F -optimal allocation at u.
Theorem 1 in Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013b) implies that condition
M-WH is also su¢ cient for implementation if free-disposal is allowed. From
this, the following positive result for SCF s can be seen readily:
Corollary 1 Assume that all agents have weak intrinsic preferences for hon-
esty. Every e¢ cient SCF is partially-honestly implementable by a natural p-q
mechanism.12
12The proof can easily be obtained from the proof of Theorem 1 in Lombardi and Yoshi-
hara (2013b) by adapting it to economies with free-disposal. At the same time, the natural
price-quantity mechanism can be constructed without using any form of "tail-chasing"
construction, as in the proof of Theorem 1 of this paper, presented in the appendix.
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Note that this general positive result, although similar in avor to (but not
an extension of,) those established by both Dutta and Sen (2012) and Kartik
et al. (2014), is obtained by a natural p-q mechanism.
However, many interesting allocation rules are not single-valued, and if
multi-valued allocation rules are concerned, there are still many interesting
rules which are non-implementable  the Walrasian correspondence, W , is
one of such examples. Example 1 below illustrates a violation of M-WH for
W where all agents have weak intrinsic preferences for honesty.
Example 1 Suppose that all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic pref-
erences for honesty. For the sake of simplicity, let n = ` = 3, and let
!i = (1; 1; 1) for each i. Choose u such that a Walrasian equilib-
rium allocation at u is x1 = (3; 0; 1), x2 = (0; 3; 0), and x3 = (0; 0; 2),
with the equilibrium price p =
 
1
6
; 1
3
; 1
2

. Let x = (x1; x

2; x

3), x
 =
(x1 ; x

2 ; x

3 ), and x
 = (x1 ; x

2 ; x

3 ) be allocations in A given by
(x1; x

2; x

3) = (x1; (0; 2; 0) ; (0; 1; 2)) ,
(x1 ; x

2 ; x

3 ) =
  
3; 0; 1
4

; x2;
 
0; 0; 11
4

,
(x1 ; x

2 ; x

3 ) =
  
3; 0; 1
2

;
 
0; 3; 1
2

; x3

.
Furthermore, as shown in the following Figures, for each i there exists
a continuous, quasi-concave and strongly monotone utility function ui
such that the sub-gradient vector of ui at xi is
ru1 (x1) =
 
1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4

, ru2 (x2) =
 
10
33
; 11
33
; 12
33

, and ru3 (x3) =
 
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2

,
while the sub-gradient vector of ui at x

i , at x

i , and at x

i is, respec-
tively,
ru1 (x1) = ru1 (x1) , ru2 (x2) =
 
1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4

, and ru3 (x3) =
 
1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4

,
ru1 (x1 ) =
 
10
33
; 11
33
; 12
33

, ru2 (x2 ) = ru2 (x2) , and ru3 (x3 ) =
 
10
33
; 11
33
; 12
33

,
ru1 (x1 ) =
 
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2

, ru2 (x2 ) =
 
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2

, and ru3 (x3 ) = ru3 (x3) .
By construction, Wi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all i and x =2 W (u) because
x1 =2 arg maxpx01p!1 u1 (x01). On the other hand, x 2 W (u) with the
equilibrium price p =
 
1
4
; 1
2
; 1
4

, x 2 W (u) with the equilibrium
price p =
 
10
33
; 11
33
; 12
33

, and x 2 W (u) with the equilibrium price
p =
 
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
2

. We established that x 2 W (u) and x1 = x1, x 2
W (u) and x2 = x2, and x
 2 W (u) and x3 = x3, in violation of
conditionM-WH.
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The main source of discrepancy between Example 1 and the existing
results in separable environments is that W is not a single-valued allocation
rule. Therefore, if we want to discuss the implementability of W by using
the existing results, this would force us to perform selections from W . This
may not be wise because a multi-valued allocation rule satisfying a property
of interest need not admit any single-valued selection with that property.13
Example 1 suggests that weak intrinsic preferences for honesty are too
weak to ensure the implementability of W . Indeed, under any mechanism 
satisfying Denition 4(ii)-(v), if each agent in Example 1 announces mi =
(p; xi) at the economy u, then the outcome should be g (m) = x by Deni-
tion 4(iii). Then, since p cannot be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector at
u, no agents announcement is a truthful point in the graph of her demand
correspondence. However, (p; xi) 2 T i (u;W ) holds for any agent because
she only concerns about the truthfulness of her demand quantity announce-
ment, thus x 2 W (u) nW (u) could be a Nash equilibrium allocation at
u.
13As an example, we may think of the upper-hemicontinuity ofW on exchange economies
with linear preferences.
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4 The main result
In this section, we introduce the second type of preferences for honesty, called
strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Then, we show that whenever there
exists at least one agent having strong intrinsic preferences for honesty, an
SCC is implementable by a natural p-q mechanism if and only if it satises a
condition called Monotonicity/Punishment with Strong Honesty (MP-SH).
Our constructive proof does not rely on any sort of tail-chasingconstruction
that is common in the constructive proofs14 of the literature. An important
implication of our result is that W is implementable.
The strong intrinsic preference for honesty cares about honestly announc-
ing a particular point in the graph of an agents true demand correspon-
dence, that is, a pair (p; xi) such that xi is consistent with F (u), in that
(xi; x i) 2 F (u) for some x i and p is an e¢ ciency price for u and F at
(xi; x i). For instance, in the case of W , an agent i satises her strong in-
trinsic preferences for honesty if she reports a true pair of a Walrasian equi-
librium price vector and an associated equilibrium demand vector, rather
than a disequilibrium pair of prices and demand quantity.15
Formally, this notion can be stated as follows.
Denition 6 Given a natural p-q mechanism , an economy u, and an SCC
F , a partially-honest agent h has strong intrinsic preferences for honesty if
her partially-honest domain is
T h (u;F ) 

(p; xh) 2 Q j 9x h : (xh; x h) 2 F (u) and p 2 F ((xh; x h) ; u)
	
.
Denition 7 A pair (p; xh) 2   Q is said to be strongly truthful for u if
and only if (xh; x h) 2 F (u) and p 2 F ((xh; x h) ; u) for some x h.
To facilitate our discussion, following Saijo et al. (1996, 1999), dene the
set of potential deviators as
IF (p; x) 
(
i 2 N j F 1
  

 
X
j 6=i
xj; x i
!
; p
!
6= ?
)
. (7)
14See Maskin (1999). For the criticism against such construction, see Jackson (1992).
15An analogous view can be applied to any F -optimal allocation and its associated
e¢ ciency price vector under certain conditions, because of the second welfare theorem.
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For each i, each ui and each xi, let @L (xi; ui) denote the upper boundary of
L (xi; ui), that is, @L (xi; ui)  fx0i 2 L (xi; ui) j ui (xi) = ui (x0i)g.
We can now state our necessary and su¢ cient condition for implementa-
tion with partially-honest agents by natural p-q mechanisms under Denition
6.
Condition MP-SH Let H, F and (p; x) 2 Qn be given. Then:
(i) Let IF (p; x) = N . Then, there exists z (p; x) 2 A, with z (p; x) = x ifP
xi = 
, such that zi (p; x) 2 Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p for each
agent i.
(ii) Let 1  #IF (p; x)  n   1. Then, there exists z (p; x) 2 A such that
for each i, zi (p; x) 2 Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p if i 2 IF (p; x) and
(p; xi) is strongly truthful for some u, or else zi (p; x) = 0.
(iii) For each agent i, there exists a map zi (; (p; x i)) :   Q ! Q such
that for each (p0; x0i):
(iii.a) If (p0; x0i) is strongly truthful for some u
0 and i 2 IF (p; (x0i; x i)),
then zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2 Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p, with
zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) =

zi (p; x) if p0 = p and IF (p; (x0i; x i)) = N ,
zi (p; (x
0
i; x i)) if p
0 = p and 1  #IF (p; (x0i; x i))  n  1.
(iii.b) Otherwise, zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = 0.
(iv) For each u, if IF (p; x) = N , Fk


 Pj 6=k xj; x k ; p  L (zk (p; x) ; uk)
for each k, and z (p; x) =2 F (u), then there is an agent i 2 H for
whom (a) (p; xi) is not strongly truthful for u; and (b) there exists
a strongly truthful pair (p0; x0i) for u such that zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2
@L (zi (p; x) ; ui).
This condition applies to cases where all agents announce the same price
vector p. Firstly, if the announced prole of quantities x is F -optimal for some
economy and p is an e¢ ciency price vector for this economy and F at x, then
MP-SH(i) sets z (p; x) = x. Otherwise, it implies that there are potential
deviators in coordinating announcement of quantities, and if all agents are
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potential deviators,MP-SH(i) selects a feasible allocation and denotes it by
z (p; x); otherwise,MP-SH(ii) selects a feasible allocation and denotes it by
z (p; x). In either case, any potential deviator i 2 IF (p; x) can be punished
by a bundle within the intersection set Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p, which
is not better than 
 Pj 6=i xj whatever is true utility function is.
Then,MP-SH(iii)-(iv) addresses the case where agents change their mes-
sages, and species a map zi (; (p; x i)) :   Q ! Q which identies how
to transform agent is bundle when she shifts her message from (p; xi) to
(p0; x0i). MP-SH(iii) basically states that zi ((p; xi) ; (p; x i)) = zi (p; x) or
zi (p; x) whenever the prole ((p; xi) ; (p; x i)) corresponds to the premises
of MP-SH(i)-(ii). The most important part is MP-SH(iv): It addresses
the case where each agent is lower contour set of an economy u at zi (p; x)
contains the intersection set Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p but z (p; x) is not
F -optimal at u. To ensure the implementability in terms of Denition 4,
z (p; x) should not be a Nash equilibrium allocation at u under any natural
p-q mechanism. However, if the standard framework is presumed, this case
implies that there can be a natural p-q mechanism under which z (p; x) is
a Nash equilibrium at u, as Saijo et. al (1996, 1999) suggest. However,
under Assumption 1 with strong intrinsic preferences for honesty, to ensure
the implementability of F ,MP-SH(iv) exploits the existence of at least one
partially-honest agent i 2 H for each given H 2 H, whose strong intrinsic
preferences for honesty are not satised in the current message prole (p; x),
and species the bundle zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) by which she can be better o¤
when she shifts to a strongly truthful message (p0; x0i).
We shall now establish our main result.
Theorem 1 Let Assumption 1 hold in conjunction with strong intrinsic pref-
erences for honesty. An SCC F 2 F is partially-honestly implementable by
a natural p-q mechanism if and only if it satises MP-SH.
Let us turn now to a brief discussion of the implications of Theorem 1.
While its main implication is a positive one, as given in Theorem 2 below,
we note an impossibility result: the e¢ cient egalitarian-equivalent correspon-
dence does not satisfy MP-SH.16
16See Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013b).
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Theorem 2 Let Assumption 1 hold in conjunction with strong intrinsic pref-
erences for honesty. Let UN = U  : : : U| {z }
n times
. Then, W is partially-honestly
implementable by a natural p-q mechanism.
Let us briey present the key details that lie behind the proof of The-
orem 2. Basically, we need to prove two things. Firstly, by specifying the
requirements of conditions MP-SH(i)-(iii) for the Walrasian rule we need
to prove the existence of consumption bundles satisfying those requirements.
Secondly, we need to prove the assertion that the Walrasian rule satises
conditionMP-SH(iv).
Let us start with the rst of these. To prove that the consumption bundles
specied in conditionsMP-SH(i)-(iii) belong to the set Wi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p,
we begin by setting the allocation z(p; x) of conditionMP-SH(i) equal to x if
this allocation is such that the amount of each commodity is equal to the to-
tal amount available from the economy or else, equal to the zero consumption
allocation. In addition, we set the allocation z(p; x) of conditionMP-SH(ii)
equal to the zero consumption allocation. Finally, we dene agent is function
zi (; (p; x i)) as follows. In all cases in which the requirements of condition
MP-SH(i) are met, we set zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) equal to zi(p; x). For all re-
maining cases, we set zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) equal to 
  
P
j 6=i xj if the pair
(p0; x0i) is strongly truthful for an economy and p
0 6= p or else, equal to the
zero consumption bundle. From this, proving the verication of conditions
MP-SH(i)-(iii) should be as expected.
To prove that the Walrasian rule satises condition MP-SH(iv), a key
step here is to show that for each economy u and each Walrasian allocation x
associated with u, the set of e¢ ciency prices for u andW at x consists only of
Walrasian equilibrium prices for x. In other words, to show that p xi = p !i
for each agent i if the price vector p belongs to W (u; x). To prove this,
we start by observing that, by our domain supposition, the set of e¢ ciency
prices for u andW dened in (3) is never empty and so W (u; x) = W (u; x).
Then, for no economy can the pair (x; p) constitute a Walrasian equilibrium
if p is an e¢ ciency price for u at x such that p  xi 6= p  !i for some agent i.
This leads straightforwardly to the conclusion that the price vector p cannot
be an e¢ ciency price for u and W at x if p is an e¢ ciency price for u at x
such that p  xi 6= p  !i for some agent i. This step also provided us with
the familiar expression for the set Wi (x; p): For each economy u and each
Walrasian allocation x associated with u, the set Wi (x; p) coincides with the
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constrained Walrasian budget set.17
Let us add a few additional observations about its completion. Suppose
that the hypotheses of condition MP-SH(iv) hold. Firstly, this can only
be the case if z(p; x) = x. This provides us with the following observation:
(x; p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for an economy u0 and p is an e¢ ciency price
for W and u0 at x. Secondly, since x does not belong to W (u), it follows
that at prices p there is an agent k for whom the utility-maximizing bundle
is outside the set of feasible ones. This leads to this key observation: The
price vector p cannot be paired with any Walrasian equilibrium allocation for
the economy u. With the preceding observations and the help of the above
denition of zi (; (p; x i)), the verication of condition MP-SH(iv) should
not present any di¢ culties. Indeed, let us consider any agent i in H who has
strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. From the preceding key observation
it is clear the pair (p; xi) is not strongly truthful for u. This veries part (a)
of the conclusion of conditionMP-SH(iv). Let us consider any pair (p0; x0i)
which is instead strongly truthful for u. Since the price vector p cannot
be paired with any Walrasian equilibrium allocation for the economy u, it
follows that p0 6= p. Note also that since, by supposition, IW (p; x) = N , it
follows that agent i belongs to IW (p; (x0i; x i)). Lastly, from the denition
of zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) one has that zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = 
 
P
j 6=i xj = xi.
From this, one can easily see that the Walrasian rule satises also part (b)
of the conclusion of conditionMP-SH(iv).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, weak and strong intrinsic preferences for honesty are intro-
duced in allocation problems of pure exchange economies with free-disposal,
and implementation problems by natural p-q mechanisms where agents have
weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty are studied. First, the Wal-
rasian rule is not implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong)
intrinsic preferences for honesty. Second, we o¤er a condition calledMonotonic-
ity/Punishment with Strong Honesty and show that not only does this condi-
tion fully identify the class of e¢ cient rules that are implementable when at
least one agent has strong intrinsic preferences for honesty, but that the Wal-
rasian rule also satises it. Thirdly, we observed that the e¢ cient egalitarian-
17The constrained Walrasian budget set is the intersection of the standard budget set
(dened by p and !i) with Q.
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equivalent correspondence is not partially-honestly implementable by natural
p-q mechanisms.
Similar to the results of Dutta and Sen (2012) and Kartik et al. (2014),
free-disposal plays a crucial role for our results as well. When feasibility
constraints are imposed with an equality, the analysis of implementation
problems by natural p-q mechanisms is more di¢ cult, as it requires the con-
struction of an outcome function satisfying the additional property of balance:
The sum of consumption bundles assigned to agents must always be equal
to the aggregate endowment. This analysis is undertaken in Lombardi and
Yoshihara (2013b).
Appendix
The following proofs were relegated from the text.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that an SCC F 2 F is partially-honestly
implementable by a natural p-q mechanism  = (M; g). We show that F
satises MP-SH. Let (p; x) 2   Qn and H be given. Let mk = (p; xk) 2
Q for each k and m  ( mk)k2N .
Let IF (p; x) = N . Then for each i, F 1

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

6=
?. Take any i and any u0 2 F 1

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

. Moreover, let
m =

m i;

p;
 Pk 6=i xk. Since x i;
 Pk 6=i xk 2 F (u0) and p 2
F

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; u0

, Denition 4(iii) implies g (m) =

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

andm 2 NE  ;<u0;H0 for eachH 0, so that g (Mi; m i)  L
 Pk 6=i xk; u0i.
Since u0 is arbitrary, gi (Mi; m i)  Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

. Since
i is arbitrary, gi (Mi; m i)  Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

for each i. Let
z (p; x) = g ( m). Then, for each i, zi (p; x) 2 Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

.
If
P
xi = 
, then 
  
P
k 6=i xk = xi for each i, so that by Denition 4(iii),
gi ( m) = xi for each i. Thus, F satisesMP-SH(i).
Suppose that 1  #IF (p; x)  n   1. By the same arguments as in
the preceding paragraph, gi (Mi; m i)  Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

for all
i 2 IF (p; x). For each i dene zi (p; x) as follows: If i 2 IF (p; x) and
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mi = (p; xi) is strongly truthful for some u, then zi (p; x) = gi ( m), or else
zi (p; x) = 0. By this denition, zi (p; x) 2 Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

if
i 2 IF (p; x) and (p; xi) is strongly truthful for some u, and that z (p; x) 2 A.
Therefore, F satisesMP-SH(ii).
Fix an arbitrary i. Dene the real-valued function zi (; (p; x i)) : Q!
Q as follows: For each (p0; x0i),
1. If (p0; x0i) is strongly truthful for some u
0, i 2 IF (p; (x0i; x i)), and p0 6=
p, then zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = gi ((p
0; x0i) ; m i).
2. If (p0; x0i) is strongly truthful for some u
0, (p0; x0i) = (p; xi), and I
F (p; x) =
N , then zi ((p; xi) ; (p; x i)) = gi ((p; xi) ; m i).
3. If (p0; x0i) is strongly truthful for some u
0, i 2 IF (p; (x0i; x i)), p0 =
p, and 1  #IF (p; (x0i; x i))  n   1, then zi ((p; x0i) ; (p; x i)) =
gi ((p; x
0
i) ; m i).
4. Otherwise, zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = 0.
By the denition, zi ((p; xi) ; (p; x i)) = zi (p; x) for case 2, while zi ((p; xi) ; (p; x i)) =
zi (p; x) for case 3. For case 1, since i 2 IF (p; (x0i; x i)), IF

p;


 Pk 6=i xk; x i =
N . By the same arguments as in the proof of MS-SH(i), gi (Mi; m i) 
Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

. Therefore, by the denition, zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2
Fi

x i;
 
P
k 6=i xk

; p

even for case 1. Since i is arbitrary, F satises
MP-SH(iii).
Fix any u. Let IF (p; x) = N , Fk

x k;
 
P
j 6=k xj

; p

 L (zk (p; x) ; uk)
for each k, and z (p; x) =2 F (u). Since gk (Mk; m k)  Fk

x k;
 
P
j 6=k xj

; p

and zk (p; x) = gk ( m) for each k, gk (Mk; m k)  L (zk (p; x) ; uk) holds for
each k. Since z (p; x) =2 NA  ;<u;H, it follows that for some i 2 H, (p; xi)
is not strongly truthful for u. Moreover, since z (p; x) =2 NA  ;<u;H and
gi (Mi; m i)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui), for the agent i 2 H there exists a strongly
truthful (p0; x0i) for u such that gi ((p
0; x0i) ; m i) 2 Fi

x i;
 
P
j 6=i xj

; p

and gi ((p0; x0i) ; m i) 2 @L (zi (p; x) ; ui). By i 2 IF (p; (x0i; x i)) and the de-
nition of zi (; (p; x i)), zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = gi ((p0; x0i) ; m i). Thus, F
satisesMP-SH(iv). Hence, F satisesMP-SH.
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Conversely, suppose that F 2 F satisesMP-SH. Denote the boundary
set of  by @. For each (x; p) 2 Qn , @Fi (x; p) is the upper boundary
of Fi (x; p), that is, @
F
i (x; p)  fyi 2 Qjyi 2 Fi (x; p) and @zi 2 Fi (x; p)
such that zi  yig. For each i, let (pi; xii) denote agent is message. Finally,
for each prole m, u, x 2 F (u) and p 2 F (x; u) dene the sets
Nu (m)  fk 2 N jmk 2 T k (u; F (u))g and Nu (m; (x; p))  fk 2 Nu (m) jmk = (p; xk)g .
With these preliminaries, we now dene the outcome function g of a p-q
mechanism  = (M; g) as follows. For each m,
Rule 1: If mj = (p; xj) for each j such that x  (xj)j2N 2 F (u0) and
p 2 F (x; u0) for some u0, and, moreover, Pxj = 
 , then g (m) = x.
Rule 2: If mj = (p; xj) with xj 6= 0 for each j,
P
xj 6= 
 and IF (p; x) = N
where x  (xj)j2N , then g (m) = z (p; x).
Rule 3: If mj = (p; xj) with xj 6= 0 for each j, 1  #IF (p; x)  n 1 where
x  (xj)j2N , then g (m) = z (p; x).
Rule 4: If, for some i, mj = (p; xj) for all j 6= i, mi = (pi; xi) with p 6= pi
and xi 6= 0, and i 2 IF (p; x) where x  (xj)j2N , then:
g (m) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(zi ((p
i; xi) ; (p; x i)) ;0 i) if zi ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) 6= 0
(xi;0 i)
if zi ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = 0 and
xi 2 Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p
(x^i;0 i) otherwise
where fx^ig  @Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; pTfyi 2 R`+j 9 2 R+; yi =
xig.
Rule 5: Otherwise,
Rule 5.1: If there is at least one agent i who announces xii = 0 and there ex-
ists (u0; x0; p0), with x0 2 F (u0) and p0 2 F (x0; u0), such thatNu0 (m; (x0; p0))
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is non-empty and that #Nu0 (m; (x0; p0))  #Nu00 (m; (x00; p00)) for all
(u00; x00; p00), with x00 2 F (u00) and p00 2 F (x00; u00),18 then
g (m) =

x01
(n+ 1) #Nu0 (m; (x0; p0)) ; :::;
x0n
(n+ 1) #Nu0 (m; (x0; p0))

,
Rule 5.2: Otherwise, g (m) = 0.
According to the proposed construction,  is a natural p-q mechanism.
Note that inRule 4, gi (m) = x^i if pi 2 @ and xii 2 QnFi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p,
since (pi; xii) =2 T i (u0;F ) for all u0. Thus, agent i can realize any element of
the set @Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p by a suitable choice of (pi; xii).
Let u be the true economy. Fix an arbitrary H. We shall show that
F (u) = NA
 
;<u;H

. Since it is a routine exercise to prove F (u) 
NA
 
;<u;H

, we shall omit the proof here. Conversely, letm 2 NE  ;<u;H.
Note m cannot corresponds to Rule 3, nor to Rule 4, as every agent who
gets the zero bundle can induce Rule 5.1 which is a protable deviation.
Case 1: m falls into Rule 1
Then, g (m) = x. Note that each i can induce Rule 4 and attain any
bundle x^i 2 @Fi (x; p) by announcing m0i = (p0; x0i), with p0 2 @ and
x0i 2 QnFi (x; p), such that fx^ig  @Fi (x; p)\fyi 2 R`+j 9 2 R+ such that
yi = xig. Thus, @Fi (x; p)  gi (Mi;m i)  L (xi; ui) for each i. By the
strong monotonicity of ui, Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui) for each i.
If i 2 H, mi =2 T i (u;F ), and there exists m0i = (p0; x0i) 2 T i (u;F )
such that gi (m0i;m i) 2 @L (xi; ui), then ((m0i;m i) ;m) 2ui , which con-
tradicts m 2 NE  ;<u;H. Therefore, for each i 2 H, mi =2 T i (u;F )
implies gi ((p0; x0i) ;m i) = zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) =2 @L (xi; ui) for any (p0; x0i) 2
T i (u;F ). By MP-SH(iv), x 2 F (u).
Case 2: m falls into Rule 2
Then, g (m) = z (p; x). If
P
zi (p; x) < 
, since F is e¢ cient, z (p; x) =2
F (u). By the same arguments as in Case 1, Fi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p 
18If there is more than one of set Nu0 (m; (x0; p0)) having the same cardinaltiy, then x
any one of the sets.
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L (zi (p; x) ; ui) for each i. Then, by MP-SH(iv), there is i 2 H with
m0i = (p
0; x0i) 2 T i (u;F ) such that gi (m0i;m i) = zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2
@L (zi (p; x)i ; ui), which contradicts m 2 NE
 
;<u;H

. Thus,
P
zi (p; x) =

. Following the same arguments as in Case 1, z (p; x) 2 F (u) byMP-SH.
Case 3: m falls into Rule 5
Since agents in H have strong intrinsic preferences for honesty and moreover,
agents respond primarily to material incentives, it is easy to see thatm cannot
correspond to Rule 5.2.19 We show that m cannot correspond to Rule 5.1
either.
Suppose that m falls into Rule 5.1. Then,
gk (m) =
x0k
(n+ 1) #Nu0 (m; (x0; p0)) for each k.
Suppose that m is such that there are at least two agents, say i and i0,
who announce the zero vector 0. By changing mi into m0i = (p
0; x0i) such that
i 2 Nu0 ((m i;m0i) ; (x0; p0)), i induces Rule 5.1 and obtains
gi (m i;m0i) =
x0i
(n+ 1) #Nu0 ((m i;m0i) ; (x0; p0))
> gi (m) ,
19Assume, to the contrary, that m 2 NE  ;<u;H falls into Rule 5.2. Then,
gi (m) = 0 and xii 6= 0 for each i. Moreover, for each i 2 H, mi 2 T i (u;F ), oth-
erwise, each i 2 H with mi =2 T i (u;F ) can switch mi to m0i 2 T i (u;F ) and ob-
tain gi (m0i;m i)  gi (m), which yields a contradiction. Furthermore, any i =2 H
if H 6= N , or else any i, can switch mi =
 
pi; xii

to m0i =
 
pi; 0

. Since in
(m0i;m i) there are agents who report strongly truthful messages for u, it follows
that for some x 2 F (u) and some p 2 F (x; u), the set Nu ((m0i;m i) ; (x; p)) is
non-empty. Among the pairs (x; p) in F (u)  F (x; u), take any pair  x0; p0 such
that #Nu
 
(m0i;m i) ;
 
x0; p0
  #Nu ((m0i;m i) ; (x; p)) for all pairs (x; p) in F (u) 
F (x; u). Note that Nu
 
(m0i;m i) ;
 
x0; p0
 6= N . If #Nu  (m0i;m i) ;  x0; p0 
#Nu ((m
0
i;m i) ; (x
; p)) for each (u; x; p) in UNF (u)F (x; u), then (m0i;m i)
falls into Rule 5.1 and agent i obtains gi (m0i;m i) > gi (m), which produces a contra-
diction. Otherwise, suppose that there exists a triple
 
u1; x1; p1

, with x1 2 F  u1 and
p1 2 F  x1; u1, such that #Nu1  (m0i;m i) ;  x1; p1 > #Nu  (m0i;m i) ;  x0; p0. If
#Nu1
 
(m0i;m i) ;
 
x1; p1
  #Nu ((m0i;m i) ; (x; p)) for each (u; x; p) in UN 
F (u)  F (x; u), then (m0i;m i) falls into Rule 5.1 and agent i obtains a prof-
itable deviation, which is a contradiction. And so on. After a nite number l of
iterations, with #Nu
 
(m0i;m i) ;
 
x0; p0
  l < n, we can nd a triple  ul; xl; pl
such that #Nul
 
(m0i;m i) ;
 
xl; pl
  #Nu ((m0i;m i) ; (x; p)) for each (u; x; p) in
UN  F (u)  F (x; u). Therefore, (m0i;m i) falls into Rule 5.1 and agent i obtains
a protable deviation, which is a contradiction.
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thereby yielding a contradiction. Therefore, m is such that there is only
one agent i who announces xii = 0. Moreover, suppose that m is such
that #Nu0 (m; (x0; p0)) < n   1. Take an arbitrary j such that j 6= i
and j =2 Nu0 (m; (x0; p0)). By changing mj into m0j =
 
p0; x0j

such that
j 2 Nu0
  
m j;m0j

; (x0; p0)

, j induces Rule 5.1 and obtains
gj
 
m j;m0j

=
x0j
(n+ 1) #Nu0
  
m j;m0j

; (x0; p0)
 > gj (m) ,
which produces a contradiction. Therefore, m is such that there is only one
agent i who announces xii = 0, the set Nu0 (m; (x
0; p0)) has cardinality equal
to n  1 and
g (m) =

x01
2
; :::;
x0n
2

.
By changing mi into m0i = (p
0; x0i) with i 2 Nu0 ((m i;m0i) ; (x0; p0)), i induces
Rule 1 and obtains gi (m i;m0i) = x
0
i, which again yields a contradiction.
Since H is arbitrary, it follows that F (u) = NA
 
;<u;H

for each H.
Finally, since u is arbitrary, the statement follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose all the hypotheses of the statement hold.
For the sake of notational parsimony, let U  : : : U| {z }
n times
 U .
Claim 1 Let (u; x) 2 U W (u) be given. The set W (x; u) in (3) is never
empty. Furthermore, it consists solely of Walrasian equilibrium prices for x,
that is, if p 2 W (x; u), then p  xi = p  !i for each i.
Proof of Claim 1. Note that since W is dened on U , if
 
x; pW

is a
Walrasian equilibrium for u, then the set W 1!
 
x; pW

dened in (2) is never
empty. From this observation, it can easily be seen that the set W (x; u)
is non-empty. To see that W (x; u) consists solely of Walrasian equilibrium
prices for x, take an arbitrary p 2  (x; u) such that for some i, p xi 6= p !i.
Then, (x; p) is not a Walrasian equilibrium for any u0 in U . It follows that
W 1! (x; p) is empty and so p is not in 
W (x; u). Since p is arbitrary, the
statement follows.
Since the pair (u; x) 2 U  W (u) in Claim 1 is arbitrary, the sets
W (x; u) possesses the following property:
W (x; u) = W (x; u) for each (u; x) 2 U W (u) ,
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and for each p 2 W (x; u) and each i, the set Wi (x; p) coincides with the
constrained Walrasian budget set20:
Wi (x; p) 
\
u02W 1! (x;p)
L (xi; u
0
i) = fyi 2 Q j p  yi  p  !ig . (8)
Next, we show that W satisesMP-SH. For, let H and (p; x) 2 Qn
be given. Since MP-SH contains four parts, we proceed by breaking the
proof into a series of claims.
Claim 2 W satises MP-SH(i).
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose (p; x) is such that IW (p; x) = N . Dene the
allocation z (p; x) as follows:
z (p; x) =

x if
P
xi = 

0 otherwise.
(9)
It is clear that zi (p; x) 2 Wi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p for each i. Therefore,
W satisesMP-SH(i).
Claim 3 W satises MP-SH(ii).
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose that 1  #IW (p; x)  n   1. Dene the
allocation z (p; x) as follows: For each i,
zi (p; x) = 0. (10)
It follows easily from the above denition that
P
zi (p; x)  
 and that
zi (p; x) 2 Wi


 Pj 6=i xj; x i ; p for each i. We conclude that W
satisesMP-SH(ii).
Claim 4 W satises MP-SH(iii).
20The constrained Walrasian budget set is the intersection of the standard budget set
(dened by p and !i) with Q.
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Proof of Claim 4. Dene the functions z and z as they are dened in the
proofs of Claims 2-3. Fix an arbitrary i. Dene the real-valued function
zi (; p; x i) as follows: For each (p0; x0i),
1. If (p0; x0i) is strongly truthful for some u
0 and i 2 IW (p; (x0i; x i)), then
zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) =
8<:

 Pj 6=i xj if p0 6= p
zi (p; x) if (p0; x0i) = (p; xi) and I
W (p; x) = N
zi (p; x) if p0 = p and 1  #IW (p; (x0i; x i))  n  1
(11)
2. Otherwise, zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = 0.
Given the denitions in (9)-(10) and given the above denition of zi (; p; x i),
one easily checks that W satisesMP-SH(iii).
Claim 5 W satises MP-SH(iv).
Proof of Claim 5. Dene the functions z, z and zi as they are dened in
the proofs of Claims 2-4. Fix an arbitrary u. Suppose that IW (p; x) = N ,
Wk


 Pj 6=k xj; x k ; p  L (zk (p; x) ; uk) for each k, and z (p; x) =2
W (u). Given the denition of z (p; x) in (9), the only case to consider isP
xi = 
. Then, in this case, z (p; x) = x, and so, by denitions, (x; p) is a
Walrasian equilibrium and p 2 W (x; u0) for some u0.
Moreover, since Wk (x; p)  L (x; uk) for each k, z (p; x) = x 2 W (u0) nW (u)
implies that there is an agent k for whom xk =2 arg maxyi2R`+: pykp!k uk (yk).
However, since xk 2 arg maxyi2Q: pykp!k uk (yk) by Wk (x; p)  L (x; uk),
arg maxyi2R`+: pykp!k uk (yk)

\ Q = ? holds, which suggests that p can-
not be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector at u. Thus, for any i 2 H, the
pair (p; xi) is not strongly truthful for u. This veries MP-SH(iv.a). Let
(p0; x0i) be any strongly truthful pair for u. Then, p
0 6= p. By IW (p; x) =
N , i 2 IW (p; (x0i; x i)). By denition of zi (; (p; x i)) in (11), we have
zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = xi, thus W satisesMP-SH(iv.b).
The proof concludes by observing that the set H and the pair (p; x) were
arbitrarily taken.
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